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The Diagnostic Cost Group Hierarc h i c a l
Condition Category (DCG/HCC) payment
models summarize the health care pro b l e m s
and predict the future health care costs of
populations.  These models use the diag-
noses generated during patient encounters
with the medical delivery system to infer
which medical problems are pre s e n t .
Patient demographics and diagnostic pro-
files are, in turn, used to predict costs. We
describe the logic, stru c t u re, coeff i c i e n t s
and perf o rmance of DCG/HCC models, as
developed and validated on three impor-
tant data bases (privately insure d ,
Medicaid, and Medicare) with more than 1
million people each.
INTRODUCTION
Role of Health-Based Payment
Models
Since 1985, HCFA has made capitated
payments to managed care organizations
that enroll Medicare beneficiaries.  HCFA,
using a demographic risk adjuster to calcu-
late payments equal to 95 percent of what
health maintenance organization (HMO)
e n rollees “would have cost” had they
remained in the traditional fee-for-service
Medicare program, paid less-than-average
dollars for the group who originally trans-
f e rred into these programs.  However,
HCFA still appears (on average) to have
overpaid, because the early switchers into
M e d i c a re managed care were healthier
than comparably aged non-switchers
(Brown et al., 1993).  Anticipating and
responding to this problem, HCFA has
sponsored much research, including devel-
opment of the Diagnostic Cost Gro u p
(DCG) models, with the goal of being able
to better match HMO payments to the
health care needs of enrollees.  Since 1984,
when researchers at Boston University and
Brandeis initiated this work for HCFA,
DCGs have evolved into a family of meth-
ods for using administrative data collected
during patient encounters to calculate
health-based “expected costs” for popula-
tions (Ash et al., 1986, 1989, 1998; Ellis and
Ash, 1995; Ellis et al., 1996a, 1996b; Pope et
al., 1998, 1999, 2000).
DCG models use age, sex, and diag-
noses generated from patient encounters
with the medical delivery system to infer
which medical problems are present for
each individual and their likely effect on
health care costs for a population.  Some
versions of the DCG models focus on diag-
noses that form the principal reason for an
inpatient admission, now called “PIP diag-
noses” (Ash et al., 1989; Ellis and Ash,
1995; Pope et al., 2000).  Other versions,
such as the DCG/HCC models of this arti-
cle, utilize the full range of diagnoses gen-
erated during all face-to-face encounters
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with clinicians (Ellis et al., 1996a, 1996b;
Ash et al., 1998; Pope et al., 1998).
W h e reas previous publications using
DCGs have calibrated models solely for
Medicare samples, in this study, we con-
trast the ability of DCG/HCC models to
predict resources in three different sam-
ples: privately insured, Medicaid, and
Medicare.
Payment methods establish incentives.
For example, when payments follow a
“piecework” model, as in traditional fee-for-
service medicine, providers are rewarded
for doing more—whether the additional
utilization is valuable or not.  Conversely,
capitated payments encourage doing
less—whether through efficiency or stint-
ing. Further, flat-rate capitated payments
i n t roduce a new perverse incentive: to
enroll healthy people and to do the very lit-
tle re q u i red to keep them enro l l e d .
Models that pay each person’s expected
cost eliminate the incentive to “select on
risk” and make efficiency the main way for
a plan to achieve a competitive advantage
(Van de Ven and Ellis, 2000). 
Although risk-adjusted payment solves
the problem of perverse patient-selection
incentives, linking payments to a risk-
adjustment model may lead plans to invest
u n p roductive eff o rt in making their
enrollees “look needier” according to that
model.  For example, models that pay more
for health care “users” encourage both
a p p ropriate and unnecessary utilization;
those that identify illness only through hos-
pitalizations encourage admissions, and
those that pay more for people with more
coded illnesses encourage “diagnostic dis-
covery.”  This last incentive can be good to
the extent that it rewards plans that keep
better track of their members’ chronic ill-
nesses (Greenwald et al., 1998).  The
degree of imperfection in incentive-setting
is one criterion in choosing among pay-
ment models.  Furthermore, how much
imperfection is acceptable depends upon
the nature and level of problems associated
with available alternatives.
Predicting Costs in a Range of
Populations
The original DCG models are prospec-
tive, that is, they use baseline, or year 1,
data to infer the level of need for health
care in year 2 and were developed to pre-
dict costs for Medicare beneficiaries.
Medical conditions (diagnoses) detected in
year 1 are used to organize people into
groups with similar levels of future health
care need.  The distribution of all members
by levels of future need characterizes an
enrolled group and is used to determine a
health-based payment.  More recently, we
have developed DCG models to calculate
expected concurrent expenses, that is,
expenses that occur in the same year as
the diagnoses used to characterize the pop-
ulation (Pope et al., 1998, 1999, 2000).  We
have also adapted both prospective and
concurrent modeling frameworks for use
in Medicaid and commercially insured (pri-
vate) populations under the age of 65 (Ash
et al., 1998).  
Concurrent models may be particularly
useful for provider profiling and monitor-
ing, because knowing all the medical prob-
lems being treated during a period of time
is particularly relevant for estimating the
level of re s o u rces used to treat them.
However, prospective models, which pre-
dict future costs, are more appropriate for
creating payments to managed care orga-
nizations that assume financial risk,
because they focus on the presence of ill-
nesses, such as cancer and heart disease,
that predictably make people more expen-
sive to treat.
In this article, we describe prospective
models only, as they apply to three sepa-
rate populations: a national sample of 
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commercially insured enrollees under age
65, enrollees in Michigan’s Medicaid pro-
gram, and a national sample of Medicare
beneficiaries.  We refer to these three pop-
ulations and the models that pertain to
them as private, Medicaid, and Medicare.
Continuing the tradition in which DCG
models were originally developed, these
models reflect concern for appro p r i a t e
incentives in payments to health care plans
and providers.  All DCG/HCC models
(regardless of the population or whether
they are concurrent or prospective) rely on
a common classification structure, which
we describe later.  Diversity across popula-
tions is handled by using different coeffi-
cients, different exclusions of potential pre-
dictors from payment models, and differ-
ent constraints on coefficients across age
or eligibility groups. 
Model Criteria: Accuracy, Feasibility,
and Incentives
The DCG models strive for accurate pre-
dictions in the face of limitations on the
available data and concerns about incen-
tives.  The goal is to effectively predict costs
f rom data that should be present in any
health care delivery system, while limiting
the re w a rds for undesirable behavior with
respect to either treatment or re p o rt i n g .
Although our descriptive system does
classify all recorded diagnoses in order to
create a comprehensive picture of prob-
lems seen, concerns about incentives
cause us to not model some information.
For example, we do not use the number of
hospitalizations to predict cost, so as to
avoid disadvantaging medical care organi-
zations that are good at treating sick peo-
ple with fewer hospitalizations.  Nor do we
count how often a diagnosis appears.
Conceptually, DCG models are designed to
predict higher costs when they detect addi-
tional conditions associated with elevated
costs.  Based on clinical judgment and con-
cerns about incentives, we exclude some
condition categories (CCs) from contribut-
ing to predictions entirely.  For example,
the presence of chemotherapy is noted in
the diagnostic codes, and, therefore we
classify it into a CC (number 115); howev-
er, our prospective models do not pay more
for it.  Higher payments are based on the
presence of a particular type of cancer,
rather than a choice of therapy.
METHODS
Populations and Data
We describe payment models for three
populations whose types of health cover-
age span the major ways in which health
care is provided in the United States today.
Specifically, we use:
• A nationally dispersed, privately insured
( i n d e m n i t y - c o v e red) population of 1.4
million people in 1992 and 1993 (the pri-
vate data).
• One million individuals covered by
Michigan’s Medicaid program in 1991-
1992 (Medicaid).
• Medicare’s 5-percent research sample
from 1991 and 1992.
The outcome variable, total pro g r a m
costs in year 2, is defined as total covered
expenses—an amount that includes copay-
ments, deductibles, and third-party pay-
ments—in each data set.  Costs for people
with less than a full year of entitlement in
year 2 are annualized, based on their
observed cost per month; in analyses, we
treat their data as “fractional observations”
(Ellis and Ash, 1995).  The three popula-
tions differ substantially with respect to
age and sex distributions, health care
costs, and hospital experience (Table 1).
In each population, most of the data are
used (in a development sample) to estab-
lish the model stru c t u re and to fit 
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coefficients, while the rest of the data (the
validation sample) are used for measuring
model performance.  Finally, regressions
based upon all the data are used to produce
the model coefficients in this article.
A fourth data set, consisting of 191,877
people under age 65 in a State employee
benefit program (State data), is used to fur-
ther validate the private model’s ability to
discriminate costs within important sub-
sets of a new population, as described later.
DCG/HCC Models 
The letters DCG/HCC are used to dis-
tinguish the multicondition Hierarc h i c a l
Condition Category (HCC) models from
the single-condition PIP-DCG model that
HCFA is using to calculate payments to
Medicare HMOs in the year 2000 (Ingber,
1998; Iezzoni et al., 1998; Health Care
Financing Administration, 1999).
Each DCG model is designed to use the
diagnostic codes from the I n t e rn a t i o n a l
Classification of Diseases, 9th Revision,
Clinical Modification (ICD-9-CM) (Public
Health Service and Health Care Financing
Administration, 1980) on the claims that
hospitals and physicians submit to payers.
(For a discussion of diagnostic coding
issues, refer to Iezzoni, 1997.)  Each
DCG/HCC model uses the same CCs for
p rediction, all of which are based on diag-
nostic codes, rather than pro c e d u res.  DCG
models summarize a person’s health fro m
his or her CCs and estimate expected costs
based on these profiles.  Although DCG
models re w a rd medical-problem identifica-
tion, not all CCs are or should be used to
modify payments to plans.  In designing
DCG models, we have anticipated “DCG
c reep” (changes in diagnostic coding for
the purpose of increasing DCG-based pay-
ments) by making the models less sensitive
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Table 1
Age, Sex, Hospital Experience, and Total Health Care Costs in Three Populations1
Characteristic or Statistic Private Medicaid Medicare
Number 1,379,970 1,103,367 1,360,626
Prediction Year 1993 1992 1992
Percent by Age
0-17 Years 26.7 51.4 0.0
18-44 Years 44.9 40.0 3.2
45-64 Years 28.4 8.7 5.8
65 Years or Over 0.0 0.0 91.0
Percent Female by Age
0-17 Years 51.3 50.9 0.0
18-44 Years 44.9 29.4 36.1
45-64 Years 46.6 40.0 39.4
65 Years or Over — — 60.7
Total Prediction-Year Costs
Mean $1,592 $1,430 $3,778
Standard Deviation 8,236 5,407 10,523
Coefficient of Variation 517 378 279
Median 85 121 516
99th Percentile 25,472 23,208 57,423
Maximum 2,412,707 1,253,880 1,533,060
Percent with Zero Prediction-Year Costs 42.9 32.3 16.1
Percent Hospitalized in the Prediction Year 4.8 8.4 21.2
1 For people with at least 1 month of eligibility in each of the baseline and prediction years.
SOURCE:(Ash et al., 1998; Pope et al., 1998.)
to expected changes.  In particular, our
models exclude some CCs and impose
hierarchies to reduce the sensitivity of pre-
dicted costs to three things: (1) variations
in coding practice; (2) intentional coding
proliferation with the aim of improving
provider reimbursement (gaming); and (3)
inconsistent coding of less serious or
vague conditions. 
Diagnostic Groups (DxGROUPs)
With more than 15,000 codes, the distinc-
tions created by ICD-9-CM are too fine to be
used directly as a payment classification sys-
tem.  There f o re, we group ICD-9-CM codes
into 543 categories, called “DxGROUPs,”
which are the building blocks of DCG/HCC
models.  Each DxGROUP has a two-level
numerical label and a short, clinically infor-
mative text name.  All DxGROUPs with the
same “whole number” stem are clinically re l a t-
ed.  For example, the “4.xy” series refers to
infectious diseases, with 4.01 being bacterial
enteritis, 4.02 viral enteritis, 4.03 other intesti-
nal infections, 4.04 tuberculosis, and so on.
Each recognized ICD-9-CM code maps
to a unique DxGROUP; each DxGROUP
encompasses diagnostic codes that
describe very similar medical problems.
We place in the same DxGROUP alterna-
tive codes that can be used for the medical
conditions that clinicians generally think of
together (such as congestive heart failure
and cardiomyopathy or deep vein throm-
bosis and deep vein thrombosis in preg-
nancy) or codes for medical conditions that
a re not easily distinguished (such as
chronic bronchitis and emphysema).
Condition Categories
DxGROUPs are clustered in a CC when
they contain medically related problems
with similar expected costs.  We created
the 118 diagnosis-based CCs used for mod-
eling in each population using a mix of clin-
ical judgment and empirical cost data. The
core physician panel making these judg-
ments consisted of four internists experi-
enced in health services re s e a rc h .
Specialist consultants assisted in several
a reas including pediatrics, HIV/AIDS
(human immunodeficiency virus/acquired
immunodeficiency syndrome), pediatric
surgery, obstetrics, and neonatology.
Although we sought to create CCs with at
least 500 cases in our private sample of
around 1 million people, that goal is subor-
dinated to the objective of clinical homo-
geneity.  For a few conditions (such as
mental re t a rdation, quadriplegia, and
underweight neonates), we accept signifi-
cantly smaller numbers. 
We eliminate logical inconsistencies in
diagnostic coding that can be identified by
comparing with age and sex.  For example,
we drop a diagnosis of uterine disorder in a
male.  However, we do not drop neonatal
codes found in the re c o rds of non-infant
females.  When an infant dies shortly after
b i rth, insurance companies sometimes do
not create a separate eligibility re c o rd but
rather assign the neonatal codes to the
m o t h e r.  Curre n t l y, two CCs are used to clas-
sify neonatal codes assigned to mothers.
The CCs are organized in broad system
groups (such as four CCs for infections,
eight for neoplasms, and three each for dia-
betes and metabolic disorders).  Short
names (such as Infection1, Diabetes3)
denote such CC groups; numbering within
a short-name series generally indicates
d e c reasing expected costs (e.g.,
Neoplasm1 contains metastatic cancers,
Neoplasm2 contains high-cost site-specific
cancers, Neoplasm3 has moderate-cost
cancers, on down to Neoplasm8, benign
neoplasms).
Table A in the Technical Note shows for
each CC, its number, long name, short
name and the CCs that it donimates in the
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model hierarchy explained in the following
section. A complete list of the individual
DxGROUPs indicating their organization
into CCs is available at www. d x c g . c o m
under the heading “DCG Clinical
Classification System in Detail.” (This
information can also be obtained by con-
tacting the lead author.)
CC Hierarchies
A payment model should not be sensi-
tive to every diagnostic code re c o rd e d
because this will result in poorly specified
coefficients and unstable estimates of the
relative risk of populations.  For example, a
female who has metastatic cancer (CC 5)
could also be coded with cancer in two or
more specific body sites, such as the liver
(CC 6) or connective and soft tissue (CC
7).  She may also have been tested for
other “uncertain” (CC 10) or “benign” cel-
lular changes (CC 12).  A regression model
that separately assigns credit for each of
these diagnoses will have confounded
parameter estimates, because the costs of
people with only the simpler problems get
averaged in, or confounded, with costs for
people with both simple and more conse-
quential conditions.  Also, such models
reward most the plans that capture as
many codes as can be legitimately defend-
ed in an audit—a behavior with little social
value.  To dampen these incentives, we use
hierarchies to constrain CC assignment as
follows: a person classified into a CC is not
also classified into a lower ranked CC in
the same hierarchy.  An important feature
of an HCC model is that the hierarchies are
not imposed across unrelated medical
problems.  For example, for a female with
both cancer and diabetes, hierarchies are
used to retain only the “worst” evidence of
each disease, but both cancer and diabetes
CCs are used in predicting her costs next
year.
Hierarchies are identified for each CC in
the rightmost column of Table A by indi-
cating which CCs are dominated; dominat-
ed CCs are zeroed out for a person when a
dominating CC is present.
The CC hierarchies capture both chron-
ic and serious acute manifestations of par-
ticular disease processes, as well as their
seriousness in terms of expected costs.
Some hierarchies, such as neoplasm, are
simple; CC 5 dominates CC 6, which domi-
nates CC 7, all the way down to CC 12.
Other hierarchies, such as gastrointestinal,
a re more complex, as illustrated in Figure 1.
A person may be classified with either, or
both, acute and chronic high-cost gastroin-
testinal problems; however, if either of
these is coded, information about moder-
ate or lower cost GI disorders is ignored.
Clinically, hierarchies reduce the sensi-
tivity of predicted payments to the coding
of less serious manifestations of the same
condition; statistically, they make explana-
t o ry variables more nearly ort h o g o n a l ,
increasing statistical precision. Imposing
hierarchies typically increases the estimat-
ed coefficients and t-ratios of serious con-
dition categories. 
Excluded Condition Categories
We also exclude some CCs from the mod-
els entire l y, by constraining their coeff i-
cients to be zero; the result is that the pre s-
ence of that condition for an individual will
not increase his or her predicted cost.
Money that “disappears” from the pre d i c-
tion when a positive coefficient is con-
strained to zero is re d i s t r i b u t e d — g e n e r a l l y
reappearing as slight increments to demo-
graphic variables. Each model still accounts
for the costs of treating all conditions. 
The most common reason for exclusion
is the a priori medical judgment that a cur-
rent problem triggering this CC this year
should have little effect on next-year costs.
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Examples are (non-melanoma) skin can-
cers; benign cancers; lower cost ear, nose,
and throat disorders; minor injuries; and
screening (for example, presence of a rou-
tine checkup). 
A second reason for exclusion is that a
CC does not add to expected costs (either
its coefficient in our modeling sample is
actually negative or it is not statistically sig-
nificantly positive).  Reassuringly, these are
generally the same CCs clinically thought
to have little effect on future costs.
Excluding CCs that would subtract from
the payment preserves the monotonic char-
acter of the model.  To ensure that adding a
code does not reduce predicted costs, each
CC with a non-positive coefficient is exclud-
ed or constrained, even if it might seem that
the CC should be in the model.
A final reason for exclusion is concern
over “gaming,” that is, a perverse health
plan response to the incentives created by
the model.  Thus, the models do not pay for
the often vague or discretionary conditions
included in CCs such as moderate and
other endocrine disorders (CCs 17 and
18), and lower cost mental disorders (CC
35).  Such exclusions improve the models’
attractiveness for setting payments, at the
cost of some loss in accuracy.
Coefficient Constraints
Especially for conditions that are rare
(such as mental retardation, ranging from
mild to profound, in an employed popula-
tion), unconstrained models can lead to
higher payments for less serious condi-
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GI 
Disorders
High-Cost
Chronic GI
Disorders
Neither 20 nor 21
HCC 20
Moderate-Cost
GI Disorders HCC 22
Lower-Cost
GI Disorders HCC 23
High-Cost
Acute GI
Disorders
Yes HCC 21
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
NOTE: HCC is Hierarchical Condition Category.
SOURCE: (Ash et al., 1998.)
Figure 1
Sample of a Condition Category Hierarchy: Gastrointestinal (GI) Disorders
tions.  Thus, in a few cases, we impose
restrictions across sets of CCs, forcing pre-
dictions for conditions that are higher in a
hierarchy to be at least as large as predic-
tions for conditions that they dominate (as
“profound mental retardation” dominates
“mild mental retardation”).  These restric-
tions avoid plans receiving higher pay-
ments for “downcoding.”  We also do not
modify some surprisingly low-cost coeffi-
cients that appear to be real artifacts of the
coverage or delivery systems to which
they apply, in the sense that they capture
all costs covered by the program that col-
lected the data but do not reflect expendi-
tures from other sources.  An example of
this is the relatively low cost for people
with renal failure in Medicaid because
Medicare is likely to be the primary payer
for most of the very high treatment costs
for these people. 
Clinical Refinements, Including
Interactions with Age
The DCG classification system, original-
ly focused on chronic conditions of the
elderly, now handles distinctions for a full
age and population spectrum.  There are
21 DxGROUPs organized into 5 CCs for
neonates (ages 0 to 1).  Additional new CCs
include four for the mentally re t a rd e d
(common only in Medicaid), five for men-
tal health and substance abuse, five for
accidents and injuries, seven for pregnan-
cy, and four for congenital and/or distinct-
ly pediatric problems.
Ultimately, a single comprehensive clas-
sification system, with 543 DxGROUPs
organized into 118 CCs and a common set
of imposed hierarchies, is used to profile
the medical problems present for any per-
son, regardless of age, sex, or type of insur-
ance.  However, the cost consequences of a
given diagnostic profile can be affected by
demographics.  For example, some CCs
are separately priced for pediatric popula-
tions (age under 18), in the private or
Medicaid populations, when clinical judg-
ment and empirical evidence find substan-
tial differences in utilization by age (e.g.,
CC 70, asthma, adds $1,513 for adults and
only $825 for children in the private data.)
The Medicare model also re c o g n i z e s
age/medical interactions for a few condi-
tions (such as HIV and aplastic anemia).
For people with such conditions, certain
costs are associated with it in elderly per-
sons (those age 65 or over), but additional
dollars are associated with costs of care
among the disabled (younger persons
whose Medicare entitlement derives from
disability).
Demographic Variables
In a given year, healthy people, whether
they are age 8 or 80, incur few medical
expenses.  However, average health care
costs differ dramatically by age and some-
what by sex.  Much of this is driven by dif-
ferences in disease prevalence because, for
example, most children 8 years of age are
fully healthy, while most persons age 80
have one or more chronic conditions
requiring medical attention.  Some of the
cost diff e rence is attributable to diff e r-
ences in the nature of certain diseases (or
how they are treated) in children, young
adults, or seniors.  Additionally, however,
even among those with no medical prob-
lems this year, demographically defined
subgroups, such as females of childbearing
age, or the oldest old, have different aver-
age costs next year.  In a pro s p e c t i v e
model, even after accounting for the med-
ical problems present, the additional
effects of age and sex on expected costs
remain important.
The three models (private, Medicaid,
and Medicare) recognize three key age
groups: 0-17 years, 18-64 years, 65 years or
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over, either by allowing some distinct CC
coefficients for those under as opposed to
over age 18 in the younger populations or
by using distinct Medicare coefficients for
those 65 or over.
The private and Medicaid models con-
tain 16 indicators that place people within
same-sex, similar-age groups (ages 0-5, 6-
12, 13-17, 18-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, and 55-
64).  The Medicare model constrains coef-
ficients among its disabled enrollees under
age 65 to distinguish only ages 0-34 and 35-
64; it then makes 5-year breaks between 65
and 94 years of age; the highest age cate-
gory is 95 or over.
Eligibility Categories
In addition to age and sex categories, the
Medicaid model incorporates nine addi-
tional variables that distinguish among five
distinct groups of enrollees: (1) the blind
and disabled (11 percent); (2) those eligi-
ble because of other medical problems (8
percent); (3) pregnant women (2 percent);
(4) those with poverty-related entitlement
(71 percent); and (5) others (9 percent).
We assign each person to one of the cate-
gories based on reason for entitlement dur-
ing his or her earliest month of enrollment
in year 1.  Observed annual expenditures
per person in year 2 averaged $1,430 and
differed substantially by category.  The
blind and disabled are by far the most
expensive, at $5,585 annually in year 2.
P regnant women cost about twice the 
average ($2,708); the “other medical” 
and “other” groups are about average 
($1,281 and $1,500, respectively) and the
non-medical, poverty-related group, con-
sisting mainly of children enrolled under
Aid to Families with Dependent Children,
cost about one-half the average ($731). 
Four of the new variables are indicators
(yes-no variables) that distinguish
Medicaid’s other subpopulations from the
least expensive, poverty-related subgroup.
The remaining five additional demographic
variables in the model are interactions of
eligibility category and duration of (year 1)
Medicaid enrollment.  These variables
allow the model to reflect the fact that
recent entrants to the Medicaid program
cost more than longer term “stayers,” and
that the “premium” for recent entry varies
not only by duration of enrollment but by
eligibility type.  These five variables each
have the form:
(Eligibility type) * (Amount added per
missing year-1 month) 
How all this works is best illustrated
with examples, as shown in the following
section.
Sample Calculations of Expected
Costs
Each HCC model prediction is the sum
of a demographic part and a health-status
part.  We illustrate this in Figure 2 for two
privately insured females 58 years of age.
The numbers here are private-model coef-
ficients, shown in the first column of Table
2.  Both patients’ estimated costs begin
with a demographic component of $1,730,
which is the final prediction for any fully
healthy, privately insured female between
the ages of 55 and 64.  Each of these
patients, however, also has medical condi-
tions with expected consequences for
future health care costs. 
Figure 2 shows how the model orga-
nizes each patient’s ICD-9-CM data into a
clinical profile that leads to the health-status
part of her prediction.  For patient 1, her
breast cancer diagnosis adds $2,372; her
hypertension, a distinct medical problem,
adds another $915, for a total of $5,017.
Patient 2 has breast cancer, too, but her
cancer has metastasized and is coded at
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multiple sites (lung, liver, and bone). Note
the different ways that additional informa-
tion about cancer is reflected in the classi-
fication: in one, distinct but related diag-
noses are classified into the same
DxGROUP; in another, related DxGROUPs
a re classified into the same CC; in a third ,
one CC is ranked higher than another.  In
the end, only a single payment amount
($21,884) is calculated for metastatic 
cancer; any additional codes pertaining to
benign or malignant neoplasms are
i g n o re d .
Another example clarifies how the
Medicaid demographic/eligibility variables
work.  This time the numbers are drawn
f rom the Medicaid column of Table 2. We
compute the predicted cost for a female
age 20 with no medical problems and a full
year 1 of povert y - related Medicaid by
adding $560 (the “female, age 18-24” base
amount) to $476 (poverty-related eligibili-
ty) for a total of $1,036.  If the female had
been present for only 10 months in year 1,
we add another $112, that is, $56 for each
of the two missing year-1 months, for a
total of $1,148.  If she were present for only
2 months in year 1, we would add 10 x 56 to
$1,036, for a total of $1,596.  In contrast,
consider a female of the same age and pre-
sent for 10 months in year 1 but who is eli-
gible for Medicaid because of disability
rather than poverty.  We add three num-
bers to arrive at the demographic part of
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Figure 2
Sample Information Used to Predict Next Year’s Expenses for Privately Insured Patients
Patient 1
Prediction
for Year 2 Information from Year 1
$1,730 Base: Female Age 58
2,372 CC 8:Neoplasm4 (Lower Cost Cancers/Tumors)
DxGROUP: 11.01 (Breast Cancer)
ICD-9-CM:174.9 (Malignant Neoplasm Breast, NOS)
915 CC 57: Hypertension
DxGROUP: 70.04 (Secondary Hypertension)
ICD-9-CM: 405.19 (Other, Benign, Secondary Hypertension)
5,017 Total of All Scores
Patient 2
Prediction
for Year 2 Information from Year 1
$1,730 Base: Female Age 58
21,884 CC 5:Neoplasm1 (Metastatic Cancer)
DxGROUP: 19.02 (Secondary Cancer, Respiratory/Digestive System)
ICD-9-CM:197.0 (Secondary Malignant Neoplasm Lung)
ICD-9-CM:197.7 (Secondary Malignant Neoplasm Liver)
DxGROUP: 19.03 (Secondary Cancer of Other Site)
ICD-9-CM: 198.5 (Secondary Malignant Neoplasm Bone)
0 CC 8:Neoplasm4 (Lower Cost Cancers/Tumors)
DxGROUP: 11.01 (Breast Cancer)
ICD-9-CM:174.9 (Malignant Neoplasm Breast, NOS)
$23,614 Total of All Scores
NOTES:CC is Condition Category. DxGROUP is Diagnostic Group. ICD-9-CM is International Classification of Diseases, 9th Revision, Clinical
Modification. NOS is not elsewhere specified.
SOURCE:(Ash et al., 1998.)
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Table 2
Statistics for Private, Medicaid, and Medicare Prospective Payment Models
Statistic or Variable Private Medicaid Medicare
Number of Observations 1,379,023 1,103,367 1,360,626
Prediction Year Mean Total Costs 1,593 1,430 3,778
Number of Model Parameters 102 136 96
R 2 x 100 9.4 21.1 8.8
Validated R 2 x 100 9.1 23.1 8.5
Standard Error 7,843 4,802 9,963
Age/Sex Groups Model Coefficients
Female
0-5 Years 295 -6 1,324
6-12 Years 241 0 1,324
13-17 Years 479 270 1,324
18-24 Years 613 560 1,324
25-34 Years 1,187 337 1,324
35-44 Years 1,120 345 1,155
45-54 Years 1,401 446 1,202
55-64 Years 1,730 537 1,698
65-69 Years ‡ ‡ 1,042
70-74 Years ‡ ‡ 1,318
75-79 Years ‡ ‡ 1,675
80-84 Years ‡ ‡ 1,962
85-89 Years ‡ ‡ 2,161
90-94 Years ‡ ‡ 2,258
95 Years or Over ‡ ‡ 1,897
Male
0-5 Years 312 87 955
6-12 Years 271 113 955
13-17 Years 473 334 955
18-24 Years 370 86 955
25-34 Years 574 132 955
35-44 Years 778 392 904
45-54 Years 1,218 571 887
55-64 Years 2,126 526 1,403
65-69 Years ‡ ‡ 1,428
70-74 Years ‡ ‡ 1,743
75-79 Years ‡ ‡ 2,215
80-84 Years ‡ ‡ 2,426
85-89 Years ‡ ‡ 2,725
90-94 Years ‡ ‡ 3,027
95 Years or Over ‡ ‡ 2,980
Medicaid Eligibility Categories
Blind/Disabled ‡ 1,449 ‡
Other Medical ‡ 429 ‡
Poverty-Related ‡ 476 ‡
Pregnant Women ‡ 96 ‡
Other ‡ -263 ‡
Medicaid Amount Added per Missing Base Year Month for
Blind/Disabled ‡ 179 ‡
Other Medical ‡ 71 ‡
Poverty-Related ‡ 56 ‡
Pregnant Women ‡ 296 ‡
Other ‡ 100 ‡
Condition Categories2
1 Infection1 HIV/AIDS 22,580 5,284 1,076
2 Infection2 Septicemia (Blood Poisoning)/Shock 8,677 3,663 3,253
3 Infection3 Central Nervous System Infections 4,658 † 760
5 Neoplasm1 Metastatic Cancer 21,884 6,331 6,185
6 Neoplasm2 High-Cost Cancer 11,967 3,278 3,905
7 Neoplasm3 Moderate-Cost Cancer 5,863 1,288 2,128
8 Neoplasm4 Lower Cost Cancers/Tumors 2,372 550 873
13 Diabetes1 Diabetes with Chronic Complications 7,726 3,686 3,582
14 Diabetes2 Diabetes with Acute Complications/
Non-Proliferative Retinopathy 3,806 2,392 2,396
See footnotes at end of table.
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Table 2—Continued
Statistics for Private, Medicaid, and Medicare Prospective Payment Models
Statistic or Variable Private Medicaid Medicare
15 Diabetes3 Diabetes with No or Unspecified Complications 1,961 369 1,147
16 Metabolic1 Protein-Calorie Malnutrition 13,639 5,012 3,594
19 Liver Liver Disease 5,700 4,007 3,028
20 GI1 High-Cost Chronic Gastrointestinal Disorders 4,312 2,944 1,336
21 GI2 High-Cost Acute Gastrointestinal Disorders 2,087 1,213 1,329
22 GI3 Moderate-Cost Gastrointestinal Disorders 1,432 748 730
24 MSK1 Bone/Joint Infections/Necrosis 3,653 3,563 2,070
25 MSK2 Rheumatoid Arthritis and Connective Tissue Disease 2,380 870 1,218
27 Blood1 Aplastic and Acquired Hemolytic Anemias 9,801 6,562 4,035
28 Blood2 Blood/Immune Disorders 4,248 3,637 709
30 Dementia Dementia 4,822 1,324 438
31 Mental1 Drug/Alcohol Dependence/Psychoses 3,568 2,223 1,122
32 Mental2 Psychosis and Other Higher Cost Mental Disorders 3,092 3,599 1,288
33 Mental3 Depression and Other Moderate-Cost Mental Disorders 2,171 834 540
34 Mental4 Anxiety Disorders 1,788 771 511
36 MR1 Profound Mental Retardation 2,544 22,370 †
37 MR2 Severe Mental Retardation 2,544 16,064 †
38 MR3 Moderate Mental Retardation 2,544 11,677 †
39 MR4 Mild/Unspecified Mental Retardation 2,544 5,508 †
40 Neuro1 Quadriplegia 12,506 5,632 5,686
41 Neuro2 Paraplegia 12,506 3,467 5,788
42 Neuro3 Higher Cost Neurological Disorders 3,939 1,452 1,851
43 Neuro4 Moderate-Cost Neurological Disorders 1,936 1,037 1,261
45 Arrest1 Respirator Dependence/Tracheostomy Status 41,465 24,247 9,117
46 Arrest2 Respiratory Arrest 13,396 3,538 8,087
47 Arrest3 Cardio-Respiratory Failure and Shock 3,416 2,673 2,809
48 Hrt_CHF Congestive Heart Failure 5,114 2,714 2,069
49 Hrt_ARR Heart Arrhythmia 1,872 928 670
50 Hrt_AMI Acute Myocardial Infarction 4,723 3,792 1,778
51 Hrt_CAD1 Other Acute Ischemic Heart Disease 3,442 1,639 1,807
52 Hrt_CAD2 Chronic Ischemic Heart Disease 2,871 511 883
53 Hrt_VHD Valvular and Rheumatic Heart Disease 1,128 741 938
54 Hrt_HTN Hypertensive Heart Disease 1,346 436 347
57 HTN Hypertension (High Blood Pressure) 915 312 216
58 Stroke1 Higher Cost Cerebrovascular Disease 3,902 1,523 1,919
59 Stroke2 Lower Cost Cerebrovascular Disease 1,795 645 835
60 Vascular1 High-Cost Vascular Disease 2,486 1,420 1,268
61 Vascular2 Thromboembolic Vascular Disease 2,505 2,316 1,429
64 Lung1 Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease 2,633 1,034 1,669
65 Lung2 Higher Cost Pneumonia 8,092 3,455 4,037
66 Lung3 Moderate-Cost Pneumonia 3,411 492 1,229
68 Lung5 Pulmonary Fibrosis and Other Chronic Lung Disorders 3,254 936 829
69 Lung6 Pleural Effusion/Pneumothorax 2,239 2,506 1,456
70 Lung7 Asthma 1,513 409 624
72 Eye1 Higher Cost Eye Disorders 783 1,110 242
74 ENT1 Higher Cost Ear, Nose, and Throat Disorders 685 620 147
76 Urinary1 Dialysis Status 37,287 3,693 6,821
77 Urinary2 Kidney Transplant Status 10,333 215 6,468
78 Urinary3 Renal Failure 17,834 5,742 3,107
79 Urinary4 Nephritis 1,050 1,026 1,627
81 Genital1 Female Infertility 2,242 455 †
82 Genital2 Moderate-Cost Genital Disorders 889 345 89
84 Preg1 Ectopic Pregnancy 1,957 951 †
85 Preg2 Miscarriage/Abortion 1,892 1,064 †
86 Preg3 High-Cost Completed Pregnancy 572 262 †
87 Preg4 Moderate-Cost Completed Pregnancy 572 262 †
88 Preg5 Normal Delivery 572 262 †
89 Preg6 Higher Cost Pregnancy without Completion 4,060 1,674 1,634
90 Preg7 Lower Cost Pregnancy without Completion 4,060 1,674 1,634
91 Skin1 Chronic Ulcer of Skin 3,756 2,468 2,473
93 Injury1 Vertebral Fractures and Spinal Cord Injuries 2,992 546 1,289
94 Injury2 Hip Fracture/Dislocation 1,280 463 993
95 Injury3 Head Injuries 763 95 428
96 Injury4 D rug Poisoning, Internal Injury, Traumatic Amputation, Burn 1,588 932 1,256
98 Complic Complications of Care 2,369 1,380 798
See footnotes at end of table.
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Table 2—Continued
Statistics for Private, Medicaid, and Medicare Prospective Payment Models
Statistic or Variable Private Medicaid Medicare
101 Peds Very-High-Cost Pediatric Disorders 5,901 2,067 †
102 Cong1 Higher Cost Congenital/Pediatric Disorders 4,948 710 2,081
103 Cong2 Moderate-Cost Congenital Disorder 1,603 355 532
104 Cong3 Lower Cost Congenital Disorder 829 334 348
105 Baby1 Extremely-Low-Birthweight Neonates 13,238 1,852 †
106 Baby2 Very-Low-Birthweight Neonates 13,238 1,163 †
107 Baby3 Serious Perinatal Problem Affecting Newborn 1,010 323 †
108 Baby4 Other Perinatal Problem Affecting Newborn 145 78 †
109 Baby5 Normal, Single Birth 332 78 †
110 Transplant1 Heart, Lung, Liver Transplant Status 26,576 5,312 3,552
112 Openings Artificial Opening Status/Attention 5,588 4,317 2,696
Age-Interacted Condition Category3
AI-1 Infection1 HIV/AIDS † † 8,735
AI-2 Infection2 Septicemia (Blood Poisoning)/Shock † -2,615 †
AI-15 Diabetes3 Diabetes with No or Unspecified Complications † -157 †
AI-20 GI1 High-Cost Chronic Gastrointestional Disorders † -924 4,241
AI-21 GI2 High-Cost Acute Gastrointestional Disorders 1,406 -313 †
AI-22 GI3 Moderate-Cost Gastrointestinal Disorders -1,044 -460 †
AI-24 MSK1 Bone/Joint Infections/Necrosis † -3,047 †
AI-25 MSK2 Rheumatoid Arthritis and Connective Tissue Disease † -812 †
AI-27 Blood1 Aplastic and Acquired Hemolytic Anemias † -4,872 3,365
AI-28 Blood2 Blood/Immune Disorders † -2,108 2,019
AI-30 Dementia Dementia † 373 †
AI-31 Mental1 Drug/Alcohol Dependence/Psychoses † -1,135 3,315
AI-32 Mental2 Psychosis and Other Higher Cost Mental Disorders 346 3,842 1,204
AI-33 Mental3 Depression and Other Moderate Cost Mental Disorders † 1,876 †
AI-36 MR1 Profound Mental Retardation † -4,752 †
AI-37 MR2 Severe Mental Retardation † -6,924 †
AI-38 MR3 Moderate Mental Retardation † -5,056 †
AI-39 MR4 Mild/Unspecified Mental Retardation † -1,717 †
AI-42 Neuro3 Higher Cost Neurological Disorders † 1,377 †
AI-43 Neuro4 Moderate-Cost Neurological Disorders -929 -224 †
AI-58 Stroke1 Higher Cost Cerebrovascular Disease † -1,450 †
AI-59 Stroke2 Lower Cost Cerebrovascular Disease † 1,417 †
AI-64 Lung1 Chronic Obstructive Pulmony Disease -1,904 -734 †
AI-65 Lung2 Higher Cost Pneumonia † 365 †
AI-70 Lung7 Asthma -688 † †
AI-82 Genital2 Moderate-Cost Genital Disorders 348 364 †
AI-88 Preg5 Normal Delivery † 395 †
AI-90 Preg7 Lower Cost Pregnancy without Completion † 472 †
AI-94 Injury2 Hip Fracture/Dislocation † 245 †
AI-96 Injury4 D rug Poisoning, Internal Injury, Traumatic Amputation, Burn -1,336 -554 †
AI-98 Complic Complications of Care † -710 †
AI-102 Cong1 Higher Cost Congenital/Pediatric Disorders † 2,757 †
AI-103 Cong2 Moderate-Cost Congenital Disorder 1,383 911 †
† Indicates a coefficient constrained to zero.
‡ Indicates a variable that is not relevant for a particular model.
1 The Medicare model combines age/sex categories 0-34 years for each of females and males.
2 Lines for CCs that are zeroed out in all three prospective models are not listed in this table.
3 Values are increments or decrements for younger persons in this CC (under 18 for private and Medicaid;under 65 for Medicare) after receiving the
basic CC payment coefficient listed in this table .
NOTES:Coefficients joined by a brace are constrained to be the same. CC is condition category. HIV is human immunodeficiency virus . AIDS is
acquired immunodeficiency syndrome.
SOURCE:(Ash et al., 1998; Pope et al., 1998.)
this female’s prediction: $560 for age and
sex, $1,449 for disability entitlement, and
$179 x 2 for her two missing year-1 months
as a disability-entitled person.  The demo-
graphic part of this female’s expected cost
next year is then $2,367; in computing her
total expected costs, dollars for the future
cost implications of her year-1 medical con-
ditions are added to $2,367.
We include one final example to illus-
trate how health-status information can
interact with age.  Consider the payment
for a Medicare-entitled male 66 years of
age, under treatment for drug dependence
(CC 31) but with no other recorded illness.
His predicted cost is $2,540, computed as
the sum of $1,428 for the demographic part
(the same for all males between ages 65
and 69) and a $1,122 contribution for CC
31.  Consider, however, a second male, also
drug-dependent, but only 30 years of age
and entitled to Medicare through disability.
Here, there is a $5,392 total prediction, the
sum of a $955 demographic part (the same
for any male under age 35) and $4,437 for
drug dependence.  The latter number is
computed by adding a $3,315 age-interac-
tion for a Medicare enrollee under age 65
in CC 31 to the $1,122 basic payment for
any Medicare enrollee in CC 31.  The num-
ber $3,315 is in the last column of Table 2
in the row labeled AI-31; drug problems
cost, on average, $3,315 more to treat in
younger (disabled) Medicare enro l l e e s
than in the elderly.
Models 
Table 2 shows the complete detail (sum-
mary statistics and all coefficients for all
variables) for the three DCG/HCC mod-
els.  The models are distinguished in sev-
eral ways by: (1) which CCs are excluded,
(2) which coefficients are constrained, (3)
which demographic variables and demo-
graphic-medical interactions are included,
and (4) what the model coefficients are.
We discuss each of these in turn.
Exclusions, which result in coefficients
being set to zero, were made for reasons
previously described. The lines for the 33
CCs that are excluded from all three mod-
els are omitted from Table 2. Exclusions
used in specific models appear in Table 2
as omitted coefficients (†). The private
model has no model-specific exclusions,
Medicaid has one (CC3 central nervous
system infections) and Medicare has 16,
most of them related to maternity, neonatal
and pediatric conditions that are extremely
rare in Medicare’s predominantly elderly
population.
We indicate coefficients that are con-
strained to be equal by connecting them
with a brace.  For example, because only
165 people were classified in the 4 mental
retardation categories (CCs 36 through 39)
in the private model, these 4 coefficients
a re constrained to a common value of
$2,544.  The three models differ in the
number of constraints imposed across sets
of CC coefficients, with the private model
employing the most (five) and the
Medicare model, the least (one). 
A third difference is in the variables
included in addition to the age/sex and CC
p redictors that characterize pro s p e c t i v e
DCG/HCC models.  The Medicaid model
has the most: including eligibility cate-
gories, missing-months variables, and 31
coefficients for selected age-medical inter-
actions (labeled as AI-2, AI-15, and so on,
where the AI number indicates an associat-
ed condition category).  The private model
includes 9 AI variables and the Medicare
model, 6.  The AI coefficients shown at the
end of Table 2 are the increments (decre-
ments, for negative numbers) to the basic
CC payments for a younger person with
those particular medical pro b l e m s .
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“ Younger” means under age 65 in
Medicare and under age 18 in the other
two populations.
Finally, the models differ in the values of
their coefficients.  A striking feature of
Table 2 is the similarity between the CC
c o e fficients in Medicare and Medicaid,
estimated to within 20-30 percent for about
one-half of the categories; also, for any par-
ticular CC, the larger coefficient is about
equally likely to be found in either model.
Thus, even though average costs are much
higher in Medicare than in Medicaid, the
i n c remental costs of treating part i c u l a r
conditions do not differ systematically.
Although one source of higher expected
costs next year in Medicare is larg e r
age/sex coefficients, the more important
explanation is greater disease prevalence.
For example, 1.3 percent of the Medicare
population has metastatic cancer (CC 5)
but only 0.2 percent of the Medicaid popu-
lation; for chronic complications of dia-
betes (CC 13), the rates are 1.6 percent
versus 0.2 percent; for congestive heart
failure (CC 48), 9.8 percent versus 1.1 per-
cent; for acute myocardial infarction (CC
50), 4.2 percent versus only 8 in 10,000.
Medicaid and Medicare coeff i c i e n t s ,
although similar to each other, are almost
always much smaller than coefficients in
the private model.  Typically, they are not
even one-half as large as the private model
coefficients.  For only a handful of CCs, the
Medicaid coefficient exceeds the private
model coefficient: CC 32—depression and
other moderate-cost mental illness; the
four mental retardation CCs—36 through
39; CC 69—pleural effusion/pneumotho-
rax; and CC 72—high-cost eye disorders.
In only one instance, CC 79—nephritis, is
the Medicare coefficient greater than the
private one.  We have no explanation for
this unusual finding.  It is encouraging that
the private and Medicaid models are simi-
lar in terms of the age-interacted coeffi-
cients estimated for the pediatric condi-
tions.  Of the eight AI parameters present
in both models, seven are of the same sign.
Most of the pediatric coefficients, which
were identified in the development sam-
ples, remain highly significant in these full-
data re-estimated models.
In considering the plausibility of particu-
lar model coefficients, we note that each
coefficient for a CC reflects the increment
to expected costs that is independently
associated with having the condition.  An
HIV-positive male’s prediction, for exam-
ple, is the sum of the CC 1 coefficient, all
coefficients associated with his other med-
ical problems, and any relevant demo-
graphic coefficients.  If this male has mul-
tiple medical problems, his predicted total
costs will be much larger than the coeffi-
cient for CC 1 alone.  This feature is an
i m p o r tant strength of the DCG/HCC 
multiple-condition model structure (in con-
trast to single-condition models, such as
PIP-DCG), because, in fact, people who are
HIV-positive differ widely in the range of
medical problems they experience and
how expensive they are to treat.  This
model does not simply pay more for HIV
but rather establishes appropriately differ-
ent payment amounts within the communi-
ty of people living with HIV by recognizing
comorbid conditions.
Measuring Model Performance
Because implementing a risk-adjustment
model has serious consequences, we must
understand how well the models work.
The one universally re p o rted, single-number
summary performance measure for risk-
adjustment payment models is the R2, or
the proportion of variance in costs that the
model explains.  For re f e rence, demo-
graphic payment models in private and
Medicare populations have R2 values of
less than 2 percent, and the R2 for a demo-
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graphic/eligibility model in our Medicaid
data is 7 percent (Greenwald et al., 1998;
Ash et al., 1998; Pope et al., 1998). 
Our Medicaid model has the highest
explanatory power, with a validated R 2 of
more than 20 percent, compared with 8 to
9 percent in the other two populations
(refer to the fifth row of Table 2).  The bet-
ter fit in Medicaid is attributable to several
factors.  For one, the distribution of the
outcome variable, cost, has a less extreme
upper tail (virtually no million-dollar cases)
in Medicaid.  Additionally, many people
with Medicaid coverage are eligible for
medical reasons (such as pregnancy or dis-
ability), and expenditures within medically
defined groups are more predictable than
among populations with many non-users
(Kronick et al., 1996).  Medicaid eligibility
categories also distinguish groups (such as
children in poor families) that have pre-
dictably lower medical costs because they
are basically healthy.  Finally, the “months
out” variables capture the higher expected
costs of recent entrants, an important fac-
tor in a system with sporadic entitlement. 
All three prospective DCG/HCC models
rely upon age and sex in addition to diag-
nostic information, and costs in these pop-
ulations do differ substantially by age. For
example, in the Medicaid and private sam-
ples, annual costs are each about $3,500
more for males age 60 than for females age
5; in Medicare, there is a similar difference
in annual costs for males age 90 versus
females age 65.  However, after accounting
for differences in the prevalence of medical
problems, the demographic coefficients in
our models differentiate less.  (The dis-
ease-adjusted differences are about $1,400
for males age 60 than for females age 5
among the privately insured, about $500
for a similar demographic difference in
Medicaid, and $2,000 for males age 90 ver-
sus females age 65 in Medicare.)  Although
age and sex coefficients remain highly sta-
tistically significant in each model, infor-
mation about the presence of serious,
chronic disease groups, such as diabetes
and renal insufficiency, is far more useful
for predicting costs.
Average Costs for Important
Subgroups
Although R2 values are always reported,
other ways of examining model perfor-
mance may be more useful in assessing
the value of a payment model (Ash and
Byrne-Logan, 1998).  We use some of these
to examine the private DCG/HCC model’s
performance in a fourth, entirely new data
set (a State employee health insurance
plan).  The methodology is to compare pre-
dicted versus actual year-2 average costs
within significant subgroups.  A predictive
ratio (PR) for a model applied to a sub-
group of people is formed by dividing the
model-predicted costs for the group by
their actual costs.  Thus, for example,
when an age/sex model is used to predict
costs for a group of sick people, the PR is
likely to be much less than 1.00.
Alternatively, when people are identified
retrospectively as a group whose costs
turned out to be very low, PRs for any
prospective model will be much larger than
1.00.  Prospective models should never
predict zero costs, because no one has zero
expected future health care costs.   
Figure 3 shows PRs for several clinically
defined groups of people in the State data,
as predicted by the private DCG/HCC
model and by an age/sex model.  The med-
ical condition groups were defined by an
outside panel convened by HCFA, and
membership in each group is contingent
upon the presence (during year 1) of at
least one panel-specified ICD-9-CM code.
Although the age/sex prediction is never
more than one-half the actual costs for any
of these groups (all PRs are 0.50 or less),
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the DCG prediction is commonly between
0.95 and 1.05.  The DCG model underpre-
dicts most seriously in arthritis, where
nearly 4,000 people predicted to cost
around $4,300 actually cost nearly $5,800
(PR = 0.74).  This is because the panel-iden-
tified arthritis subgroup includes anyone
with any arthritis code regardless of its
specificity, but the DCG model identifies
only a smaller, sicker subgroup.  The
model does pay $2,357 for the presence of
a well-defined, systemic rheumatoid dis-
ease, such as rheumatoid arthritis (ICD-9-
CM 714); however, it does not add dollars
for vague codes, such as ICD-9-CM 713
(other arthropathy, joint disorders,
derangements, joint pain/stiffness).  When
a model excludes payment for vague codes
associated with real costs, it becomes less
accurate; in particular, this model under-
pays for people with low-level or non-spe-
cific joint disorders, even though these dis-
orders can result in significant disability. 
In another illustration of the predictive
value of DCG/HCC models, we divide the
private validation sample into 18 groups
based on predicted cost levels specified by
the DCG/HCC model.  The healthiest
group, with predicted costs between $250
and $500, contains 21,650 people, or 11.3
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NOTES: n = 191,877. Predictive ratio equals average predicted costs divided by average
actual costs. Condition groups contained at least 500 persons, except as follows:
Lymphoma (260), Sexually Transmitted Diseases (366), Multiple Sclerosis (268),
Inflammatory Bowel Disease (463), Cystic Fibrosis (126), HIV (86), Lung Cancer (192),
and Colorectal Cancer (335). HIV is human immunodeficiency virus.
SOURCE: (Ash et al., 1998.)
Figure 3
Predictive Ratios for the Private Validation Sample, by Presence of Medical Condition
percent of the population.  (The model
does not predict costs of less than $250 for
anyone.)  The next group, with predicted
costs of at least $500 but less than $750,
contains another 21.6 percent of people. At
the other end of the spectrum, the model
predicts costs of $5,000 or more for 5.6 per-
cent of people; among these, just 74 (4/100
of 1 percent) fall into our highest cost pre-
diction group ($40,000 and over).  Within
each group, we calculate mean actual
costs, as well as the means for DCG/HCC-
predicted costs and age/sex predicted
costs. At the high end, for those with pre-
dicted costs over $5,000, the DCG/HCC-
predicted amounts track actual costs quite
well (meaning that PRs within these
groups are not far from 1.00), while the
age/sex predicted costs plateau at about
$3,300.  Figure 4, in which average actual
costs, age-sex predicted costs, and DCG-
predicted costs are plotted for people in
each of these 18 prediction groups, illus-
trates these points.  The data for Figure 4
are in Table 3.
In summary, the private model, which
was built on a large national data set, pre-
dicts costs well within a new population of
State employees.  It not only distinguishes
groups of high- and low-cost individuals but
also even identifies a high-cost tail, with
small numbers of very expensive people.
The Medicaid and Medicare DCG/HCC
models work similarly well (and 
demographic-only models, similarly poor-
ly) in analogous comparisons of actual and
predicted costs in out-of-sample validation
data sets (Ash et al., 1998; Pope et al.,
1998).
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Figure 4
Means of Actual and Predicted Costs for the Private Validation Sample, by DCG-Prediction Group
CONCLUSION
We have extracted disease profiles of
individual patients and groups of patients
from the kinds of administrative records
that many providers have been supplying
to health care payers for years.  Until now,
few plans have used these data to construct
a solid “information backbone” for manag-
ing care.  The unified, multiple-condition
DCG modeling framework characterizes
individual health status and the disease
burden of populations, as well as predicting
future levels of resource need.  When com-
paring physicians’ practices, patient pro-
files can be aggregated to describe the var-
ious mixes of medical problems that
providers handle, at the same time that the
model’s predictions can help establish fair
(risk-adjusted) resource allocations. 
Although the original purpose of these
models was to enable health care pur-
chasers, such as HCFA, to identify an effi-
cient capitation price, the models actually
provide detailed information on the preva-
lence of disease.  Such information helps
explain why some providers and plans use
more-than-average resources.  The DCG/
HCC health profiles and the model predic-
tions can be used together to routinely
identify patients who are likely to be very
costly and to find the particular medical
problems that contribute to this expecta-
tion.  Such information is invaluable for
identifying opportunities for selecting,
implementing, and evaluating the effective-
ness of disease management programs.
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Table 3
Means of Actual and Predicted Cost for the Private Validation Sample, by DCG-Prediction Group
Predicted Cost Group1 Actual Costs DCG-Predicted Costs Age/Sex Predicted Costs Counts
Less than $250 — — — 0
250 $510 $417 $570 21,650
500 672 620 855 41,384
750 931 867 1,262 22,649
1,000 1,391 1,347 1,915 28,782
1,500 1,707 1,714 2,335 30,786
2,000 2,295 2,242 3,140 16,100
2,500 2,510 2,779 3,195 5,828
3,000 3,373 3,406 3,332 9,086
4,000 3,993 4,451 2,695 4,944
5,000 4,734 5,485 2,859 3,474
6,000 6,478 6,624 2,951 2,747
7,500 8,025 8,557 3,012 1,980
10,000 11,415 11,939 3,006 1,314
15,000 15,741 17,042 3,217 441
20,000 20,426 22,377 2,853 257
25,000 31,804 27,181 2,929 227
30,000 40,559 34,087 3,010 154
40,000 61,380 52,026 2,926 74
1 Each predicted cost group contains all people whose DCG-predicted dollar cost are at least this great but less than the next higher number.
NOTES:DCG is Diagnostic Cost Group. n = 191,877.
SOURCE:(Ash and Byrne-Logan, 1998.)
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Table A
Condition Category (CC) Numbers, Long Names, Short Names, and Hierarchies
CC Number CC Long Name CC Short Name Dominated CCs
1 HIV/AIDS Infection1 None
2 Septicemia (Blood Poisoning)/Shock Infection2 None
3 Central Nervous System Infections Infection3 None
4 Other Infectious Disease Infection4 None
5 Metastatic Cancer Neoplasm1 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12
6 High-Cost Cancer Neoplasm2 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12
7 Moderate-Cost Cancer Neoplasm3 8, 9, 10, 11, 12
8 Lower Cost Cancers/Tumors Neoplasm4 9, 10, 11, 12
9 Carcinoma in Situ Neoplasm5 10, 11, 12
10 Uncertain Neoplasm Neoplasm6 11, 12
11 Skin Cancer, Except Melanoma Neoplasm7 12
12 Benign Neoplasm Neoplasm8 None
13 Diabetes with Chronic Complications Diabetes1 14,15
14 Diabetes with Acute Complications/Non-Proliferative Retinopathy Diabetes2 15
15 Diabetes with No or Unspecified Complications Diabetes3 None
16 Protein-Calorie Malnutrition Metabolic1 None
17 Moderate-Cost Endocrine/Metabolic/Fluid-Electrolyte Disorders Metabolic2 None
18 Other Endocrine, Metabolic, Nutritional Disorders Metabolic3 None
19 Liver Disease Liver None
20 High-Cost Chronic Gastrointestinal Disorders GI1 22, 23
21 High-Cost Acute Gastrointestinal Disorders GI2 22, 23
22 Moderate-Cost Gastrointestinal Disorders GI3 23
23 Lower Cost Gastrointestinal Disorders GI4 None
24 Bone/Joint Infections/Necrosis MSK1 None
25 Rheumatoid Arthritis and Connective Tissue Disease MSK2 26
26 Other Musculoskeletal and Connective Tissue Disorders MSK3 None
27 Aplastic and Acquired Hemolytic Anemias Blood1 28, 29
28 Blood/Immune Disorders Blood2 29
29 Iron Deficiency and Other/Unspecified Anemias Blood3 None
30 Dementia Dementia None
31 Drug/Alcohol Dependence/Psychoses Mental1 32, 33, 34, 35
32 Psychosis and Other Higher Cost Mental Disorders Mental2 33, 34, 35
33 Depression and Other Moderate-Cost Mental Disorders Mental3 34, 35
34 Anxiety Disorders Mental4 35
35 Lower Cost Mental Disorders/Substance Misuse Mental5 None
36 Profound Mental Retardation MR1 37, 38, 39
37 Severe Mental Retardation MR2 38, 39
38 Moderate Mental Retardation MR3 39
39 Mild/Unspecified Mental Retardation MR4 None
40 Quadriplegia Neuro1 41, 42, 43, 44
41 Paraplegia Neuro2 42, 43, 44
42 Higher Cost Neurological Disorders Neuro3 43, 44
43 Moderate-Cost Neurological Disorders Neuro4 44
44 Lower Cost Neurological Disorders Neuro5 None
45 Respirator Dependence/Tracheostomy Status Arrest1 46, 47
46 Respiratory Arrest Arrest2 47
47 Cardio-Respiratory Failure and Shock Arrest3 None
48 Congestive Heart Failure Hrt_CHF 55, 56, 57
49 Heart Arrhythmia Hrt_ARR 55, 56, 57
50 Acute Myocardial Infarction Hrt_AMI 51, 52, 55, 56, 57
51 Other Acute Ischemic Heart Disease Hrt_CAD1 52, 55, 56, 57
52 Chronic Ischemic Heart Disease Hrt_CAD2 55, 56, 57
53 Valvular and Rheumatic Heart Disease Hrt_VHD 55, 56, 57
54 Hypertensive Heart Disease Hrt_HTN 55, 56, 57
55 Other Heart Diagnoses Hrt_Misc 56
56 Heart Rhythm and Conduction Disorders Hrt_Rhythm None
57 Hypertension (High Blood Pressure) HTN None
58 Higher Cost Cerebrovascular Disease Stroke1 59
59 Lower Cost Cerebrovascular Disease Stroke2 None
60 High-Cost Vascular Disease Vascular1 62, 63
61 Thromboembolic Vascular Disease Vascular2 62, 63
62 Atherosclerosis/Unspecified Vascular3 None
63 Other Circulatory Disease Vascular4 None
See footnotes at end of table.
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Table A—Continued
Condition Category (CC) Numbers, Long Names, Short Names, and Hierarchies
CC Number CC Long Name CC Short Name Dominated CCs
64 Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease Lung1 70, 71
65 Higher Cost Pneumonia Lung2 66, 67, 69, 71
66 Moderate-Cost Pneumonia Lung3 67, 69, 71
67 Lower Cost Pneumonia Lung4 71
68 Pulmonary Fibrosis and Other Chronic Lung Disorders Lung5 70, 71
69 Pleural Effusion/Pneumothorax Lung6 71
70 Asthma Lung7 71
71 Other Lung Disease Lung8 None
72 Higher Cost Eye Disorders Eye1 73
73 Lower Cost Eye Disorders Eye2 None
74 Higher Cost Ear, Nose, and Throat Disorders ENT1 75
75 Lower Cost Ear, Nose, and Throat Disorders ENT2 None
76 Dialysis Status Urinary1 77, 78, 79, 80
77 Kidney Transplant Status Urinary2 78, 79, 80
78 Renal Failure Urinary3 79, 80
79 Nephritis Urinary4 80
80 Other Urinary System Disorders Urinary5 None
81 Female Infertility Genital1 82, 83
82 Moderate-Cost Genital Disorders Genital2 83
83 Low-Cost Genital Disorders Genital3 None
84 Ectopic Pregnancy Preg1 85, 89, 90
85 Miscarriage/Abortion Preg2 89, 90
86 Completed Pregnancy with Major Complications Preg3 87, 88, 89, 90
87 Completed Pregnancy with Complications Preg4 88, 89, 90
88 Completed Pregnancy Without Complications (Normal Delivery) Preg5 89, 90
89 Uncompleted Pregnancy with Complications Preg6 90
90 Uncompleted Pregnancy with No or Minor Complications Preg7 None
91 Chronic Ulcer of Skin Skin1 92
92 Other Dermatological Disorders Skin2 None
93 Vertebral Fractures and Spinal Cord Injuries Injury1 97
94 Hip Fracture/Dislocation Injury2 97
95 Head Injuries Injury3 97
96 Drug Poisonings, Internal Injuries, Traumatic Amputations, Burns Injury4 97
97 Other Injuries and Poisonings Injury5 None
98 Complications of Care Complic None
99 Major Symptoms Symptom1 None
100 Minor Symptoms, Signs, Findings Symptom2 None
101 Very-High-Cost Pediatric Disorders Peds 20, 22, 23, 28, 29,
43, 44, 68, 70, 71
102 Higher Cost Congenital/Pediatric Disorders Cong1 104
103 Moderate-Cost Congenital Disorder Cong2 104
104 Lower Cost Congenital Disorder Cong3 None
105 Extremely-Low-Birthweight Neonates Baby1 106, 107, 108, 109
106 Very-Low-Birthweight Neonates Baby2 107, 108, 109
107 Serious Perinatal Problem Affecting Newborn Baby3 109
108 Other Perinatal Problems Affecting Newborn Baby4 109
109 Normal, Single Birth Baby5 None
110 Heart, Lung, Liver Transplant Status Transplant1 None
111 Other Organ Transplant/Replacement Transplant2 None
112 Artificial Opening Status/Attention Openings None
113 Elective/Aftercare Surgery None
114 Radiation Therapy Radiation None
115 Chemotherapy Chemo None
116 Rehabilitation Rehab None
117 Screening/Observation/Special Exams Screening None
118 History of Disease History None
NOTES:HIV is human immunodeficiency virus. AIDS is acquired immunodeficiency syndrome.
SOURCE:(Ash et al., 1998.)
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